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NOTE
THE TRUSTEE AND THE N.L.R.B.-
THE ADMINISTRATION OF LABOR CONTRACTS IN
STRAIGHT BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION
INTRODUCTION
Two of the most important pieces of Federal legislation facing the
general business lawyer are Tides 11 and 29 of the United States Code
which are involved with the administration of debtors in bankruptcy
and/or financial reorganization, and the administration of employer-
employee relations. Standing alone, either of these two pieces of legisla-
tion, while they are not problem-free, are either clear on their face, or
are clearly interpreted by a preponderance of case law. However, such
is not the case in those instances where the two, because of the surround-
ing circumstances, must operate together.
While there is some slight discussion in each Act concerning its
effect when the other is also in operation,' and while there are a few
cases dealing with the subject, there appears to be no detailed discussion
of the various problems which arise both from the point of view of the
trustee in bankruptcy (or the receiver as the case may be) on the one
hand and that of the labor unions and the National Labor Relations Board
on the other. It is the purpose, therefore, of this paper to discuss in as
much detail as possible these problems from both the practical and,
where appropriate, the academic view points.
The first section of this paper concerns the powers of the Bankruptcy
court over the debtor's business and property, as limited by the Norris
LaGuardia Act. The second section will deal with the trustee's posi-
tion as an employer during the time he administers a business enter-
prise under the supervision of the court. Next we will discuss the
problems arising under the administration of the collective bargaining
contract itself, and finally we will discuss the power of the N.L.R.B.
over the trustee vis-a-vie the unfair labor practices provisions of the
N.L.R.A. and the effect of any such proceedings on an adjudication
of bankruptcy, or on a reorganization under chapter 10 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
1. I CCH LABOR LAW REP. 1.7.00.
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THE POWER OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT TO DEAL WITH LABOR
DIFFICULTIES OF PARTIES UNDER ITS JURISDICTION
One of the first problems which will strike the experienced eye when
dealing with a situation involving both bankruptcy proceedings (or
reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act) and a labor
dispute is the fact that both are rather closely governed by Federal
statute. Furthermore, since one is aimed at preserving as much as possible
of the employer's interests for his creditors, while the other is aimed at
preserving the rights of employees even if, in so doing, the employer's
interests may suffer,' it is highly likely where a situation involves both
circumstances, that the two Federal statutes will conflict. The question
then becomes, which shall control
Generally speaking the Federal District Court sitting in Bankruptcy
is invested with all the jurisdiction at law or in equity as will allow it
to
(15) Make such orders, issue such processes, and enter such judge-
ments, in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary
for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act.8
In addition it is generally recognized that
The Court has the power to effectuate the jurisdiction granted to it
and to prohibit acts tending to prevent the exercise of that jurisdiction
and the achievement of the purposes for which the jurisdiction was
conferred. 4
On the other hand, the Norris LaGuardia Act states that, with certain
exceptions not here relevant, no court of the United States may issue
an injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute
to prohibit any person participating in or interested in such a dispute
from doing specific enumerated acts.5
It is the generally accepted rule that where the provisions of the
2. In Local 205, United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of America v. General
Electric, 233 F. 2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1956), aff'd. 353 U. S. 547, it was held that the
Norris LaGuardia Act was intended for and has application mainly as a protection
for union & employee activities. See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of
Georgia, 229 F. 2d 901 (5th Cir. 1956).
3. 11 U.S.C.A. § 11(15)
4. 11 R .mInqrom or BANKRupTcy § 4379 (1961 ed.); cf, Dealtry v. Posse School, 100
F. 2d 470, 38 Am.B.R. (NS.) 674 (1938).
5. 29 US.C.A. S 104.
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Bankruptcy Act come into conflict with those of the Norris LaGuardia
Act, the powers of the Bankruptcy court must give way to the im-
position of the Norris LaGuardia Act.'
The language of the court in the case of Teamsters v. Quick Charge,
IC. 7was most explicit in this regard, even if it were only dicta. In that
case, while the court based its decision on the apparent fact that Quick
Charge had filed the reorganization petition solely to rid itself of its
labor dispute with the Union and stated that it would not allow such
procedures to be "used as an avenue of escape by a company in a labor
dispute," 8 it went on to hold:
But even if the proceeding in the case be construed as a genuine
proceeding for financial reorganization under the Chandler Act the
injunction must still fail. There is nothing in the Norris LaGuardia
Act which exempts equity receiverships of any kind from its pro-
visions. It prohibits injunctions in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute.
We accordingly hold that a Federal Court lacks jurisdiction to issue
any injunction either in ordinary equity receiverships or receiverships
arising under the Chandler Act in cases involving labor disputes.9
With this language in mind, the question arises: is the bankruptcy
court then shorn of all its powers to preserve the property of the debtor
from labor trouble? Here, as in most situations there are exceptions
6. Thus in Anderson v. Bigelow, 130 F. 2d 460 (9th Cir. 1942) where the question
was whether or not a district court could issue an injunction restraining workers from
picketing an employer who was in receivership, it was held:
... the history of federal injunctions does not warrant the inference that Con-
gress regarded federal receivers to be above the prohibitions of the Norris La-
Guardia Act.... A receiver's employee may ask for higher wages or shorter
hours and resign if he does not obtain them.. There seems no reason why several
of them may not agree to do so, that is to strike. Having struck, it is proper
to appeal for public support against claimed unfairness of the receiver, just as
against unfair treatment of any employer.
7. 14 L.C. par. 64,496 (10th Cir. 1948).
8. The actual holding of the court in the Quick Charge case (see note 7, supra)
was that:
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the sole purpose on the part of Quick
Charge in filing reorganization proceedings under § 77-B was to rid itself of the
labor dispute with the union.... The purpose of the Chandler Act was to afford
companies in financial distress an opportunity to reorganize on a sound basis
and thereby to escape liquidation ... through bankruptcy or receivership pro-
ceedings. It was not intended, & may not be used as an avenue of escape by
a company from the provisions of the Norris LaGuardia Act in a labor dispute
with its employees.
9. See note 8, supra.
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to the general rule which prevents its working severe hardship on any
party. The first of these exceptions manifests itself where the dispute
directly threatens damage or destruction to the property of the bank-
rupt. The second comes into play where the dispute is not a labor
dispute covered by §104 and §113 (c) 'of the Norris LaGuardia Act.
The rule of the first exception, which may be termed the "Preserva-
tion of Property" doctrine, states, in brief, that the court may issue an
injunction against any labor activity which threatens to directly damage
or destroy the property of the debtor.'0 Under this doctrine it is
generally recognized that the court has three criteria to follow in
deciding whether it has jurisdiction to issue any order aimed at pro-
tecting the property from potential damage in a labor dispute, i.e. the
property must:
1) be materially threatened by the violence of a dispute; or it must
2) be perishable in nature and will thereby be lost unless allowed to
be removed and sold by the debtor and/or trustee; or
3) is in some other way materially threatened by damage or destruc-
tion by reason of labor activities sought to be enjoined."'
It should be emphasized however, that in such a case the order of the
bankruptcy court goes no further than is necessary to preserve the
property of the debtor for the benefit of the creditors.Y
The second exception to the normal limitations placed on the power
of a bankruptcy court where a labor dispute is involved occurs when
the "labor dispute" is not one which is specifically covered by §104 or
conceded to be within the context of § 113 (c) of the Norris LaGuardia
Act."3 Under this exception it would appear that the bankruptcy court
10. See In Re Cleveland and Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198, 29 Am.BR.
(N.S.) 393 (1936) in which the workers in the debtor's Sandusky, Ohio plant went
on strike and refused to allow 12,000 barrels of beer produced in that plant to be
removed to Cleveland pursuant to reorganization proceedings in bankruptcy. The
debtor trustee sought to enjoin the union activities on the grounds that they were
causing significant harm to the reorganization process. The union answered that it
was protected in its activities under the Norris LaGuardia Act. The Court held
that where the debtor's property is subject to immediate loss or destruction from the
union activities, the Bankruptcy Court has the power summarily to order the re-
moval of the property and to enjoin the union and all others from interference by
treating the proceedings as one for the preservation of the debtor's property.
11. While these three criteria are not specifically stated in these terms they are in
essence the criteria laid down by the court in the Cleveland & S. Brewing Co. case
(see note 10, supra).
12. Note 10, supra.
13. These two sections of the Act define in specific and general terms, respectively,
just what a "labor dispute" is under the Act.
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has the power to issue an injunction prohibiting any activity, which the
trustee can show to be a result of some controversy beyond the usual
scope of a "labor dispute" as defined by the Norris LaGuardia Act. 4
The importance of this last exception should not be underestimated by
a trustee in any case in which the success of reorganization may be
threatened by labor activity since under such circumstances its scope
can be quite large, overlapping and even encompassing the protection
of the property limitation discussed above.15 While the cases are not
numerous enough to be able to draw any definite conclusion it would
appear with the operation of this exception that where the trustee
or debtor keeps good faith with the union the court will have the
jurisdiction to stop any union activity which seriously hampers the
bankruptcy or re-organization proceedings but in any case where the
trustee or debtor appears to be trying to use the bankruptcy proceeding
as a shield for his labor troubles, or otherwise refuses to keep good faith
with the union the court will find that it is barred by the Norris La
Guardia Act from assuming such jurisdiction.'0
14. The key case, establishing this exception is that of Converse v. Highway Con-
struction Co, 1 L.C. par. 18,463 (6th Cir. 1939). There the debtor acting as trustee
under a Chapter X reorganization proceeding obtained an ex parte order from the
court enjoining all persons from interfering with the property, assets, etc, of the
debtor-in-reorganization. Converse the business agent of the international union of
operating engineers insisted that the debtor must become a member of a professional
association which had certain agreements with the union. The debtor refused to
require supervisory personnel to join the union. As a result, the union picketed the
debtor's equipment to such an extent as to prevent its use, thus forcing the debtor to
discontinue its operations. On a motion to the debtor by the bankruptcy court to
cite the union leaders for contempt in refusing to recognize its restraining order it
was held that the bankruptcy court had the power under these circumstances to issue
the injunction for contempt.
The reasoning behind this decision was based on the theory that the facts in this
particular case did not present a labor dispute such as would bring it within the
prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
15. Thus in Third Ave. Transit Corp. v. Quill, 192 F. 2d 971 (2nd Cir. 1951) we
find the statement:
The case of In Re Cleveland & S. Brewing Co.; relied upon by the appellees [is]
clearly distinguishable . . . [T]he injunction [there] did not cover any of
the Acts enumerated . . . but instead merely restrained interference with the
removal of property which would have spoiled if it was not removed.
16. Compare Teamsters v. Quick Charge (note 7, supra) where the debtor
was using reorganization as a weapon in its anti-union war with the Converse case (note
14, supra) where the trustee at all times tried to keep good faith with the union, but
the union seemed to insist on making things as difficult as possible for the trustee.
Compare also, Third Ave. Transit Corp. v. Quill (note 15, supra) where the plain-
tiffs, trustees of a New York company absolutely refused to discuss the reduction of the
[Vol. 7:284
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THE TRUSTEE AS AN EMPLOYER
In a Chapter X reorganization the trustee is authorized to "operate
the business and manage the property of the debtor." 17 Once under the
control of the Bankruptcy Court, the "executory" contracts of the
debtor are subject to the possibility that the trustee will reject the
contracts of the debtor rather than carry them out to the possible
detriment of the bankrupt estate.' The principles involved in the re-
jection of a labor contract, as an "executory" contract, seem to be the
same as those involved in the rejection of any contract, under the terms
of the Bankruptcy Act. 9
Any contract which is executory, that is, which is to be performed
in the future, must either be affirmed or disaffirmed by the trustee within
60 days of the trustee's appointment, or the contract will be assumed
to be rejected.20 If a claimant under such a contract wishes to recover
under its terms, the claimant must show a clear and knowing assumption
by the trustee, mere conformance of the trustee to the contract terms
is not enough.21 But it will be shown here that case law regarding the
burden of proof of assumption by the trustee is not the same as applied
to a labor contract. The trustee may reject the collective bargaining
agreement of the debtor and prefer to run the enterprise under other
employment conditions during the reorganization period.22 The Bank-
work week from 48 hours to 40 hours and the possibility of a written contract with a
union which had been highly cooperative even to the extent of operating without a
contract for some time. There, even though the strike would cost the trustee
over $90,000 a day in lost revenues, the court held it had no jurisdiction to enjoin a
strike. While on the other hand in In Re Cleveland & S Brewing Co. (note 10, supra)
where the trustees were entirely innocent, the court held that in a case which usually
would be considered a labor dispute under the Norris LaGuardia Act, there was
no labor dispute such as would bar it from issuing an order enjoining the union's
activity.
17. Chapter X, sec. 189 Bankruptcy Act.
18. Chapter X, sec. 202, sec. 216(4) Bankruptcy Act, the latter section provides
for rejection in the plan itself.
19. Supra note 18, See the text of the sections, there is no distinction in these
sections as to classes of executory contracts.
20. Chapter X, sec. 206 Bankruptcy Act; In Re Petrol Terminal Corp, 120 F.
Supp. 867 (D. C. Md. 1954); But as to the effect on this provision on the provision
for rejection in the plan itself, See Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. or Cm. L.R. 467 (1964).
21. Bank of America National Trust Co. v. Smith, 336 F. 2d 528 (9th Cir. 1964),
citing In Re Luscombe Engineering Co, 268 F. 2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1959).
22. Supra note 18, this provision will be discussed with the Conflict of Laws pro-
vision of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. sec. 165, further below.
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ruptcy Act provides that if the trustee wishes to adopt any contract, he
may only do so under the "supervision" of the Bankruptcy Court.2
But, in practice, the "supervision" and approval of the Court may be
implied, to bind the debtor's estate to obligations under the old labor
contract, where the trustee has conformed to the terms of a labor
contract by not changing working conditions.24
In the administration involved in In Re Public Ledger 5 such an im-
plication was made. There, the district court denied the claims of the
members of two unions claiming amounts under the fringe benefits
clause of their contracts, which had accrued while the enterprise was
under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. The district court
found that in order for the trustee to be bound to pay such amounts as
this, as an administration expense, the trustee "must positively indicate"
an intention to accept the old contract 26 But the Court of Appeals
reversed, stating,
The Court knew, too, that good labor conditions under the contract
constituted a valuable asset, and a necessary one .... It is unreasonable
to assume that the Court contemplated anything but continuance of
the labor contract as the basis for the continued services of the em-
ployees.27
The Court found the contract to be a necessary part of the proper
administration of the debtor's estate. Specifically the unions made the
claim for severance pay under the old labor contract, when the enter-
prise was finally closed by the trustee. The Court, finding that the old
contract applied, held that since the purpose of the severance pay clause
was to protect the employees from a sudden loss of income, the granting
of a claim on this clause as an ad-ministration expense would not be in-
consistent with the general aim of properly administering the debtor's
estate. Thus, the case may stand for the proposition that the principles
expressed in the case regarding claims under the labor contract will not
be blanketly allowed, but only where they are in harmony with the
purpose of the reorganization.
A claim for wages as an administration expense is given full priority
23. Chapter X, sec. 189 Bankruptcy Act.
24. In Re Public Ledger, 161 F2d 762 (3rd Cir. 1947) reversing 63 F. Supp. 1008
(ED. Pa. 1945).
25. Ibid.
26. Supra note 24, 63 F. Supp. at 1014; See Also In Re Capital Service, 136 F.
Supp. 430 (S.D. Calif. 1955).
27. Supra note 24, 161 F.2d at 676.
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for amounts earned or accrued during the period of the administration
of the debtor's estatem 8 If the benefits or terms of employment con-
ditions are not viewed as a proper administration expense, then, other
than an ordinary claim, their claim can only be a wage priority, which
although given priority, is restricted in its terms and amount. 9 The
rule as found in Public Ledger, has also been extended to clauses in the
labor contract covering vacation pay"0 and employer contributions to
an employee pension fund,3 ' where these clauses are viewed as a part
of the consideration given for the efforts of the employees.
Where the trustee does act on the labor contract by rejection, the
trustee may modify wages,as or discharge employees when found
necessary to the proper administration of the bankrupt's estate. The
N.L.R.B. may not interfere with the right of the trustee to exercise these
rights 4 While the N.L.R.A. provides for its precedence when in con-
flict with the Bankruptcy Act, 5 it has been found that rejection of the
labor contract by a trustee in bankruptcy involves no conflict between
the two laws and so the rejection is not brought within the purview of
the N.L.R.A36 But these rules do not apply when the enterprise is one
covered by the Railway Labor Act.37 If the trustee wishes to reject
or modify the labor contract, the procedure involved must conform to
the exclusive means provided for in the scheme set up by Congress
governing labor relations under that Act.3s
28. Chapter X, Article XIII Bankruptcy Act; Also sec. 64(1) Bankruptcy Act,
allowing for "actual and necessary" administration expenses.
29. Sec. 64a(2) Bankruptcy Act, allows for "wages and commissions not to ex-
ceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned within 3 months before the
date of commencement of the proceeding." Thu in some situations a claim as an
administration expense would net the claimant more than under the wage priority.
30. In Re Capital Service, 136 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Calif. 1955); In Re Wil-low Cafe-
terias Inc, 111 F.2d 429 (2nd Cir. 1940), here the debtor remained in possession and
agreed to continue the work with the workers under the same conditions, as the old
contract.
31. In Re Schenectady Railway Co., 93 F. Supp. 67 (D.C. N.Y. 1950).
32. In Re New York, Ontario & Western Railway Co, 16 L. C. par. 65,009 (S.D.
N.Y. 1949).
33. Stevenot v. Narberg, 210 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1954).
.34. Matter of American Buslines, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 877 (D.C. Nebk. 1957).
35. 29 U.S.C. sec. 165.
36. In Re Klaber Brothers, Inc, 173 F. Supp. 83 (SD. N.Y. 1959).
37. In Re Overseas National Airways, Inc, 238 F. Supp. 359 (ED. N.Y. 1965); Rail-
way Labor Act, 45 US.C. chapter 8.
38. In Re Overseas National Airways, Inc, supra note 37; Sec. 77n Bankruptcy Act,
states that, "no judge or trustee acting under this Act shall change wages or working
conditions of railroad employees except as provided in the Railway Labor Act."; In
the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. sec. 151-163, and sec. 181-185, provide for the methods
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Rejection by the trustee, of any contract, operates as a breach of con-
tract by the debtor as of the date of the petition in bankruptcy and
creates a claim in favor of the contract holder.39 Such a claim is
provable in and dischargeable in bankruptcy if the damages due to
rejection are reasonably calculable at the time.40 Adjudication of
bankruptcy, itself, may be treated by the holder of an "executory"
contract as an anticipatory breach of contract, which may give rise
to a claim. 1 However, for employees or their union, adjudication ends
their formal rights under the collective bargaining agreement.42 In
reorganization proceedings the union may only participate in the hear-
ing on the Plan at the discretion of the presiding judge,43 with no right
of appeal as the union can not be considered an "affected" party.44 In
In Re Overseas National Airways, Inc.,4 5 the Court pointed out some
of the equitable considerations involved in any rejection of a labor
contract by a trustee,
It seems to me, however, that the Bankruptcy Court, when it has
the power to reject a collective bargaining agreement, should do so,
only after a thorough scrutiny and a careful balancing of the equities
on both sides, for in relieving the debtor from its obligations under
the collective bargaining agreement, it may be depriving the em-
ployees affected of their seniority and pension rights, as well as other
valuable rights which are incapable of forming the basis of a provable
claim for money damages.
UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES IN "STRAIGHT" BANKRUPTCY AND
REORGANIZATIONS
In Chapter X reorganizations the Bankruptcy Court should approve a
plan, "if fair and equitable and feasible", and fix a time within which
the creditors and stockholders "affected by the plan" may accept it.4
of altering these things. Sec. 156 provides that the union must be given 30 days written
notice of any change affecting working conditions and a conference shall be held
between the parties with the Mediation Board to be called in in case of any disagree-
ment.
39. Chapter X, sec. 202 Bankruptcy Act.
40. Beggs v. Simon, 163 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1942).
41. Manufacturers Trading Corp. v. Roberts, 138 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1943).
42. See sec. 70a, Chapter X, sec. 187 Bankruptcy Act.
43. Chapter X, sec. 206 Bankruptcy Act; Report of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, May 27, 1938 p.6 .
44. Peckham v. Casalduc, 261 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1958).
45. Supra note 37, at 361.
46. Chapter X, sec. 174 Bankruptcy Act.
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The plan must be accepted by two-thirds of the creditors in amount
and one-half of the creditors in number.47 Even if accepted, creditors
or stockholders who are adversely affected by the provisions of the
plan may have a hearing before the Bankruptcy Court on their
objections to the plan. Such persons, adversely affected, have a right
of appeal from the Court's order of approval of the plan.4 9 In all these
proceedings the union has no right to intervene, but may only be a
participant, at the discretion of the Bankruptcy Court.60 The mere fact
that the union may have participated in the proceeding in this manner,
gives it no right of appeal on any ruling made by the Court at the
hearing.51 Only an adversely affected party has the right to intervene
in the approval of the plan and carry its objection to appeal. t5
"Creditor", under the Act is defined as "the holder of any claim." 5
Further, the Act states,
[C]reditors or stockholders or any class thereof shall be deemed
'affected' by the plan only if their or its interest shall be materially
and adversely affected thereby. In the event of controversy the
Court shall, after hearing, upon notice, summarily determine whether
any creditor or stockholder or class is so affecied.64
Thus, where the claim is without value in any case, the claimant is not
considered as being adversely affected. 5 If the claimant's interest is
adequately protected in the plan, in any case, the claimant is not viewed
as being adversely affected. 6 A claim of a union founded on a breach
of contract, due to the rejection of the trustee, can not be adversely
affected by the plan, for adjudication ends the potential value of the
labor contracts. 7 But the plan is binding on all parties regardless of
47. Chapter X, sec. 179 Bankruptcy Act.
48. Chapter X, sec. 206 Bankruptcy Act.
49. In Re Keystone Realty Holding Co., 117 F.2d 1003 (3rd Cir. 1941), 45 Am.B.R.
(N.S.) 536.
50. Chapter X, sec. 206 Bankruptcy Act.
51. In Re South Street Building Corp, 140 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1943).
52. In Re Flour Mills of America, Inc, 27 F. Supp. 559 (D.C. Mo. 1939).
53. Chapter X, sec. 170a Bankruptcy Act.
54. Chapter X, sec. 106(4) Bankruptcy Act.
55. In Re V-I-D, Inc., 226 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1955), the claimant must affirmatively
show his claim would have been worth something, but for the reorganization plan;
Heard v. Peerless Cement Corp., 46 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. 1951); See Also In Re Ebaloy,
CCH B~Ac. L. REP. par. 57,022 (D.C. III. 1951).
56. Country Life Apartments, Inc, v. Buckley, 145 F.2d 935 (2nd Cir. 1944).
57. Supra note 42, This would only apply to future benefits of the labor contract
to the union or its members. Past due debts to the union or its members are claims
as any other debt and are dealt with below.
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whether they are "affected" by it or not,rs and the only liabilities of
the debtor are those found in the plan.""
In straight bankruptcy the problem of the labor contract is simpler,
for a further continuation of the debtor's business is not contemplated.
Therefore only the amount of the union claim and its priority are in
question. The greatest protection afforded the employees is the wage
priority in bankruptcy.60 Whether the fringe benefit provisions of the
labor contract come within the priority is the greatest area of con-
troversy.61
Vacation pay is viewed as part of the consideration paid to the
employees for their work and as accruing daily. Where under the labor
contract, employees were entitled to vacation pay after one year's
employment, and it was not due at all until the completion of that year,
the wage priority for this item, would only go back to amounts earned
within three months of bankruptcy. 2 Even if the one year period is
completed within three months of bankruptcy, only the amounts ac-
crued within that time are entitled to the wage priority. However,
if the employer is to contribute amounts into a "vacation and holiday
benefit fund" on a fixed percentage of the monthly payroll, the
contract must give each employee a direct vested interest in the fund
or unpaid employer contributions will not be entitled to the wage
priority. 4
In general, the claim for unforwarded union dues from a bankrupt
employer under a dues check-off clause of the labor contract, have
been held to be entitled to a preference as a wage claim.6 5 The right
of the union as a claimant is founded upon the logic that the check-off
clause gives the union the same right to the wage priority as an assignee
of a wage earner would have.
58. Chapter X, sec. 224 Bankruptcy Act.
59. Chapter X, sec. 288(1), sec. 226 Bankruptcy Act.
60. Sec. 62a(2) Bankruptcy Act; supra note 29.
61. See Generally, Fringe Benefits of the Labor Contract in Bankruptcy Court,
Daniel L. Schneidman, 15 L..J. 73 (1964).
62. California Labor Law Enforcement Division v. Sampsell, 172 F.2d 400 (9th Cir,
1949); Matter of Ranalax Corp, 104 F. Supp. 25 (ED. N.Y. 1958); Arabian v. Cole-
man, 388 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1964).
63. Contra Matter of Munro-Van Helms Co, 30 L. C. par. 70,141 (N.D. Ala. 1956)
reversed 243 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1957).
64. Sulmeyer, trustee v. Southern California Pipe Trades Fund, 301 F.2d 768 (9th
Cir. 1962).
65. In Re Reed Furniture Co, Referee's Memo., 15 L.C. par. 64,765 (S.D. Calif.
1948).




As to unpaid employer contributions to union welfare funds, the
priority of these as wages was in doubt6 7 until the Supreme Court of
the United States in United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Ino., re-
solved the question. In that case the bankrupt employer had agreed
to contribute $8 a month per employee to a union welfare fund. The
title to the fund was in the fund trustees and individual employees
could not claim any specific portion of it. The Court stated that
preferences in bankruptcy should be narrowly construed. The amounts
paid by the employer had no relation to the compensation of the
employees and the payment had none of the usual characteristics of a
wage. Thus, unless the employees can claim a direct right in the fund
or the contribution is related to individual compensation, the claim
is not entitled to priority as a "wage".
THE CoLLEcTIvE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AND SuccEssoR OWNERSHIP
As has been seen, there has been no recognition in the bankruptcy
court, of a union claim as to potential benefits to the employees under the
labor contract; to examine this principle critically, the present state of
labor law regarding survivorship of obligations under the labor con-
tract through changes of ownership, company mergers and plant
removals, must be considered. The purpose of bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion is to maintain the continuity of a going enterprise. 0 Thus if legal
rights remain with the "res" of the industrial community,71 then there
are substantial and potential contractual rights by reason of the labor
contract which are entitled to recognition in bankruptcy.
The N.L.R.B. has consistently found that change in ownership or
plant removal, does not affect the bargaining status of a certified unit,
where there is a substantial continuity of interests and operations. 72 The
67. No wage priority; Security Fund v. Hack, 242 F2d 375 (2nd Cir. 1956); Matter
of Victory Apparel Mfg. Corp, 154 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. N.J. 1957); Matter of Sleep
Products, Inc., 30 L.C. par. 69,848 (S.D. N.Y. 1956); Matter of Brassel, 135 F. Supp.
827 (N.D. N.Y. 1955). Contra, given the wage priority as a part of "agreed compen-
sation" for services, Matter of Otto, Referee's Memo, 30 L.C. par. 70,027 (S.D. Calif.
1956) affirmed Matter of Otto, 146 F. Supp. 786 (SD. Calif. 1956).
68. 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
69. This decision is criticized in 15 LJ. 73, Supra note 61.
70. See RF GroN ON B.Amuxuprcy, vol. 11 Corporate Reorganization Sec. 4345 to
4348.
71. Contract Enforcement and the Courts, Labor Contracts in the Courts, Theodore
J. St. Antione, 15 LJ. 583 at 589 (1964).
72. See Herman Lowenstein, Inc, 75 NLRB 377 (1947), at 379 the Board laid down
this rule, "While the Board has on occasion held that the purchaser is the successor
of the seller and bound by the latter's obligations where the record discloses a con-
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Board has held that there must be an unusual change of circumstances
for decertification of a proper unit to take place.73 When the employ-
ing industry remains essentially the same, a change of ownership is no
such unusual circumstance. 4 But the N.L.R.B. has been reluctant to
hold that the successor is bound by the terms of the labor contract, where
the successor performs no acts of assumption of the old contract. 75
It has been held, however, that where a successor wishes to alter any
condition of employment, he may not do so without regard to the
bargaining unit's rights.76 The substantive affect of the old contract
has not yet been decided by the N.L.R.B. The more common charac-
terization of this issue as a breach of contract action has been heard in
the federal district courts,77 usually under the arbitration clause of the
old contract.
In applying the old labor contract to a successor, there are two
common law hurdles that must be overcome; (1) the law of contracts
which states that he who is not a party to a contract should not be
bound by it,75 and (2) the rule that employment rights terminate when
the employment relationship ends. 9
tinuity of interest and operations, the Board has also held that mere purchase of certain
physical assets, without the assumption of obligation with respect to employees of the
seller, does not constitute a successor of the seller."
73. Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142 NLRB 437 (1963).
74. Id., at 442, The Board also stated, "Respondent urges that it is not the successor
to Missouri because the terms of the Sales Agreement did not provide that respondent
assume any of Missouri's liabilities, accounts payable or obligations, because it did not
purchase any of Missouri's accounts receivable, because it did not purchase any
Missouri good will, and because it never represented to anyone that it was the successor
in interest to Missouri. In sum, the respondent contends that all it purchased from
Missouri were certain physical assets....
We find, however, that the advent of respondent affected no substantial changes in
the operating entity . . . It is conceded that respondent continued Missouri's business
from the same location, handled the same products, used the same equipment and con-
tinued to serve the same customers and, most significantly, a majority of the employees
in the unit, we have found, were formerly Missouri's employees." at 441; See Also Main-
tenance, Incorporated, 148 NLRB 1299 (1964); Randolph Rubber Co. Inc., 152 NLRB
No. 46 (1965).
75. Rohlik Inc, 145 NLRB 1236 (1964).
76. Chemrock Corp, 151 NLRB No. 111 (1965), But here the majority of the Board
restricted its opinion, 'We do not hold . . . that the purchaser of an enterprise is
legally obligated to refrain from making any changes . . . Rather we hold that . . .
the purchaser may not ignore the collective bargaining representative in dealing with
them as to matters related to the continuation of their employment and the terms and
conditions of such employment." footnote number 8, of the majority opinion.
77. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185.
78. Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc, 227 F. Supp. 843 (WiD. Pa. 1964) re-
versed 335 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir. 1964).
79. N. Y. Labor Relations Board v. Club Transportation Corp., 192 Misc. 1000, 81
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A formal employer-employee relationship in the enterprise is no
longer necessary to give persons certain rights in the enterprise under
the labor contract. Certain of these rights are said to have "vested"
and cannot be destroyed by a change of plant location. s0 But these rights
must be subject to modification due to actual changes in the industrial
community caused by this action."' The United States Supreme Court
in John Wiley & Sons v. Liingstons2 has held that it is for the arbitrator
to account for the changes and their effects on employee rights. There
the union brought an action in the district court to compel arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement executed by a company which
Wiley had acquired by merger. The union sought to arbitrate the
effect of the merger on the employee's rights under the old contract.
The Court stated that the successor was required to arbitrate the effect
of the old contract rights of the employees on the present employer-
employee relationship. The Court found that as a matter of law the
arbitrator could find that the employees were entitled to the same
seniority rights, the same wage structure, the same grievance procedure,
the same severance pay, and the same vacation pay.83 The Court
further stated,
the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the union does
not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by
the agreement, and that in appropriate circumstances, present here,
the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union
under the agreement.84
The Court held that the usual laws of contracts do not apply to the
collective bargaining agreement, but policy considerations of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act make the labor contract the "common law"
of the industrial community which binds the parties."5 But, for the same
agreement to apply, there must be "substantial continuity" of opera-
N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. Westch. Co. 1948) reversed 275 AD. 536, 90 N.Y.S.2d 367
(Sup. Cr. AD. 1949).
80. Zdanok v. Glidden Co, 288 F.2d 99 (2nd Cir. 1961); Contra Am. Bakery and Con-
fectionary Int. Union v. Liberty Baking Co, 242 F. Supp. 238 (W.D. Pa. 1965), hold-
ing that the union security clause is binding only so long as an employer-employee
relationship exists.
81. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., supra note 80.
82. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
83. Id., at 558.
84. Id., at 548.
85. Id., at 550.
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tions. 6 In Wiley, the Court was careful to point out that the actual
terms of sale or merger were unimportant, the test being whether the
industrial community remained intact.s7
Changes in the industrial community, if not so substantial as to disrupt
it's continuity, must be weighed by the arbitrator. In Steelworkers v.
Reliance Universal, Inc.,"" the paramount role of the arbitrator was set
out in a situation where employees rights under an old labor contract
were sought to be imposed on a successor company. While holding
that the old contract could not, be applied absolutely, the court found
that it had some effect,
The pre-existing labor contract indicates the structure of labor
relations and the established practice of the shop at the beginning of
the new proprietorship, an arbiter of a subsequent complaint charging
unwarranted departure from that scheme may properly consider any
relevant circumstances arising out of the change of ownership, as
well as the provisions and practices under the old contract.89
Thus, the party succeeding to the business where there is a labor contract
is bound by the provisions of the contract to the extent that there are
no extensive changes at the work place. But is a bankruptcy reorganiza-
don a sufficient change in circumstances? The purpose of a bankruptcy
reorganization is to allow the bankrupt to remain in business; the
enterprise should not be considered as defunct 0 It has been held under
the New York State Labor Relations Law that reorganization is not
a sufficient change so as to decertify a proper bargaining unit.91 It may
be that circumstances of a plan of reorganization are sufficient to allow
enough continuity to give the old labor contract some effect.
The effect of any changes in the community is to be determined by
the labor arbitrator who is especially qualified to consider all relevant
matters regarding the needs of a particular industrial community.9 2
Arbitrator's opinions have differed as to the effect on a successor enter-
86. Id., at 551.
87. Supra note 82; This conclusion has been failed to be drawn by some courts from
Wiley, in McLeod v. Local 202, 239 F. Supp. 452 (SD. N.Y. 1965), the court looked
to specific terms of sale to determine the question.
88. 335 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir. 1964) reversing 327 F. Supp. 843 (WD). Pa. 1964); Also
Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Wk. Union, 332 F2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
89. Id, 335 F2d at 895.
90. RzmxGtrox oN B8mauprcy, vol. 11 Corporate Reorganization Sec. 4345 note 3.
91. N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd. v. Club Transportation Corp, 275 A.D. 536, 90
N.YS.2d 367 (Sup. Ct. 1949); But See McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co, 53
L.C. par. 11,026 (2nd Cir. 1966) reversing 247 F. Supp. 113 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
92. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 US. 574 (1960).
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prise wfien the predecessor has merged, changed ownership, or changed
location. Where the old contract contained a clause purporting to
bind sucessors or assigns of the parties,93 the arbitrators have held that
the successor's knowledge of the liabilities of the predecessor to the
union under the contract, is the controlling factor.94 Some arbitrators
have simply weighed the equities involved in either dove-tailing seniority
or lessening a man's job security.95 Others have considered the subject
merely from the standpoint of who is a party to the labor contract,
stating that if the successor was not a party to the contract he cannot
be bound by it." Others have looked to see whether the enterprise
has remained essentially the same after either a change in ownership,
merger, or change of location; if there is no essential change then the
old contract will be applied as circumstances warrant.9 7
In the arbitration of S. B. Penick & Co.,9 the arbitrator stated the
scope given arbitrators in these situations by the Wiley99 case as follows,
The Court has by no means either hurled the gates open or leveled
the barrier whereby one not a party to a contract can be indefinitely
held accountable for all obligations thereunder under any and all
circumstances-but to the contrary, have left the door ajar for penetra-
tion solely in the discretion of the arbitrator." °
It must be concluded then that the effect of the collective bargaining
agreement must be regarded as "running" with the enterprise, at least
as long as the enterprise maintains its individual identity,' °' and it is for
93. See Dawn Farms Corp., BNA 45 LA 1075 (1965), where the arbitrator found that
a successor clause adds nothing that Wiley doesn't; A typical successor clause would
read, "During the period of this agreement, as extended from time to time, it shall be
binding upon and inure to the benefit of, the successors and assigns of the respective
parties hereto."
(National Automatic Tool Co. Inc., Richmond, Indiana and Int. Assoc. of Machin-
ists) P-H hDusrar. RELATiONS par. 53,093.1.
94. Madison-White Motors, Inc, BNA 41 LA 759 (1963); Sanborn's Motor Express,
Inc., BNA 44 LA 346 (1965).
95. American Linen Service, CCH 61-3 Aiw par. 8643; S. B. Penick & Co., BNA
43 LA 798 (1964).
96. Linde Company, CCH 63-2 ARB par. 8512; Lagomarcino-Grupe Company, CCH
64-3 ARB par. 9261; Marsh Wall Products BNA 45 LA 551 (1965).
97. Northwestern Drug Co., CCH 62-2 ARB par. 8553; Calcor Space Facility, Inc.,
BNA 41 646 (1962); Walker Bros., BNA 41 LA 845 (1963); S. B. Penwick & Co., BNA
43 LA 798 (1964).
98. Supra note 97.
99. Supra note 87.
100. Supra note 97, BNA 43 LA at 803-804.
101. Contract Enforcement and the Courts, Labor Contracts in the Courts, supra
note 71 at 589.
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the labor arbitrator to decide what effect the changes in the structure
of the employing entity will have on the old contract.
THE PLAN OF REORGANIZATION AND UNION CLAIMS-ARBITRATION?
As has been shown, the union may only participate in the hearing
on the plan of reorganization at the discretion of the presiding judge. 10 2
As merely a participant, the union has no right of appeal. 08
If a trustee rejects an executory contract, it gives rise to a debt in
favor of the party holding the contract, which is provable in bank-
ruptcy.04 Furthermore, the claim may include not only past and
present benefits under the contract, but also all future benefits which
the contract gives the aggrieved party. 05 The union contract is con-
sidered terminated when the petition is filed, and the right of the
union to a claim for future benefits is not considered a "debt".,-" On
the other hand, a party whose contract is rejected is considered a
creditor for all purposes as regarding acceptance of the plan. 07 Such
a person has a right to participate in the proceedings in order to protect
his rights. 08
The question then, if the union is to be considered as an "affected"
party in reorganization, is whether the union is adversely affected. The
claim as to future benefits must be worth something or there can be no
adverse effect to the union by the plan.' °9 There are rights which
survive changes in ownership, mergers, or plant removals in the labor
field,10 and these rights can be of some value, in many situations. While it
is true that the trustee may reject the collective bargaining agreement
and still not violate the Conflict of Laws provision of the N.L.R.A.,"'
102. of. text accompanying notes 50 and 51 supra. See In Re William Jameson &
Co, CCH BAuim. L. RP,. par. 53,990 (D.C. N.Y. 1942), right of appeal is given to
"affected" parties.
103. Peckham v. Casalduc, 261 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1958).
104. Beggs v. Simon, 163 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1942).
105. In Re Winn Shoe Co, Inc., 87 F.2d 713 (2nd Cir. 1937), 33 AM. B. R. (N.S.)
228.
106. In Re Petrol Terminal Corp., 120 F. Supp. 867 (D.C. Md. 1954).
107. In Re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).
108. Id., at 614.
109. Chapter X, Sec. 107 Bankruptcy Act; In Re Ebaloy, CCH BANKR. L. RF. par.
57,022 (D.C. III. 1951); In Re V-I-D, Inc, 226 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1955). Since the
employment has ended, then it assumed that the future rights under the labor contract
are without value.
110 of. The Collective Bargaining Agreement and Successor Ownership, Supra.
111. In Re Klaber Bros. Inc, 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
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the value of the rights under the agreement remain, and are real.l1
If the enterprise is to continue under the administration of the Bank-
ruptcy Court, the conditions of employment may be determined by the
trustee on approval of the Court. The trustee may negotiate with the
union as to conditions of employment, but if there is no agreement, and
the Bankruptcy Court finds that the offer of the trustee is as much as
may be offered at this time, the employees may thereafter find them-
selves subject to Court injunction if they engage in concerted activity
to press their position." 3 It is better that the union claims under the old
labor contract be brought into the Bankruptcy Court with the union
being an "affected" party. The effect of adjudication on the "in-
dustrial community" or the "common law" of the plant is a proper
factor to be considered when determining the effect of the old labor
contract. It may be that the adjudication is such a devastating cir-
cumstance that the contract has little effect on present conditions. In
the Wiley case"14 these effects were to be weighed by the labor ar-
bitrator, whose specialized knowledge is needed to adjust equities within
the industrial community. The policy of the N.L.R.A. favors the resolu-
tion of labor disputes by means of arbitration." 5 Thus, while the trustee
may reject the labor contract as a legal obligation of the debtor, the
effect of reorganization on the contract may be an arbitrable question.
The rule to be followed in such situations is found in Johnson v.
England."" In that case, a union brought an action in a state court to
compel arbitration on the amount of a claim under the collective
bargaining agreement, even though the plant was in the hands of a
112. See Bee Line Bus Co, P-H 1 ALAA par. 67,161 (1946), there the arbitrator
found that where the union, being fearful of a company merger, put a successor clause
in the labor contract, it was binding on the successor-employer.
113. cf. text accompanying note 16, supra, the Bankruptcy Court could find that
Norris-La Guardia would not apply, as there is no labor dispute; this is so bec:,use the
Court has found that for purposes of Reorganization the wages must be at a certain
level and it is financially impossible to pay more.
114. 376 U.S. 543 (1964); See Also Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co, 363 U.S.
574, at 582 (1960), "The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will
reflect not only what the contract says, but insofar as the collective bargaining agree-
ment permits, such factors as the effect on productivity of a particular result, its
consequences to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether its tensions will be
lightened or diminished. For the parties objective in using the arbitration process
is primarily to further their common goal of uninterrupted production under the
agreement." The Bankruptcy Act, at 11 U.S.C. Sec. 49 allows for arbitration of claims
as to amount, but it has no provision for special arbitration of disputes of a "labor
nature" .
115. Supra, cases cited in note 114.
116. 51 L.C. par. 11,005 (9th Cir. 1966).
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trustee, as the employer had been adjudicated a bankrupt. The union
claimed that the arbitration clause was still in effect and bound the
trustee.117 But the union sought labor arbitration as to the amount
of unpaid pension payments. After removal to the federal court, it was
found by the Court of Appeals that the issues raised by the union
were within the competency of the Bankruptcy Court and did not
require the specialized knowledge of a labor arbitrator. Here, the only
question was as to the amount of the claim. The Court found that if
arbitration of this question was desirable, the Bankruptcy Court would
be empowered to appoint a special arbitration board in bankruptcy,""
and there would be no reason to compel a labor arbitration. Thus, where
the union claim for labor arbitration under the contract, only involves
a question as to the amount of the claim, and the business is defunct, the
labor arbitration clause will not apply.1 9 But where there is still in-
dustrial continuity and the business is intact, the labor arbitration clause
will apply, where the matter in question requires the specialized knowl-
edge of customs and practices of a particular factory or industry. 20
If the arbitrator, in a proper situation, can find that substantial and
potential rights remain through a reorganization, until the trustee rejects
the labor contract, then that rejection may give rise to a debt which
would make the union an "affected" party.
TkE EFFECT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE N.L.R.B. oN
BAwKRurcY ADMINISTRATION
While the discussion in the first part of this paper is applicable in
general to any case where the trustee or debtor under chapter X
117. Id., the Courtes footnote number 5, "Appellants (the union) also set forth their
proposition in the following language: 'It must be concluded that these important em-
ployee rights, including the right of arbitration under a collective bargaining contract,
which have been recognized by the courts as surviving the termination of an em-
ployers operations, may not be destroyed merely because an employer files a volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy:; See Also In Re Muskegon Specialties Co, 313 F.2d 841
(6th Cir. 1963) cert. denied 375 US. 832 (1963), where the union made the same
contention for arbitration of the amount of vacation due from an employer in
corporate reorganization, but actually defunct.
118. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 49.
119. Supra note 116 and In Re Muskegon Specialties Co., note 117.
120. This conclusion is inescapable, for in both England and Muskegon, the
Courts were careful to state that labor arbitration is not required under the contract
unless; (1) labor peace at the plant is in issue, (2) the right claimed by the employees
under the contract is not clear, or (3) the character of the claim was that of the usual
labor "dispute". In both cases the plant was not operating and it was intimated in




reorganization proceedings seeks to envoke the plenary power' 2' of
the Bankruptcy Court as a means of stopping damaging labor activities,
the parties must look to a somewhat different set of principles in any
case in which either party has envoked the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board.
As in all cases involving labor disputes over which the jurisdiction
of the N.L.R.B. is envoked, the Board basically derives its power
from the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Section 10 (a) M
of that Act specifically authorizes the N.L.R.B. to prevent "any person"
from engaging in any unfair labor practices affecting interstate com-
merce. Reading this Section in connection with sectioft 2 (1) of the
N.L.R.A.123 which defines person as:
... one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships... cor-
porations... tor] trustees in bankruptcy [emphasis supplied]2 4
It becomes apparent that for purposes of the N.L.R.A. a trustee [and/or
a debtor in Chapter X reorganization proceedings] is. subject as any
other "person" to the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. Furthermore in
this instance there is no problem with a conflict between the labor
law and the Bankruptcy Act since, unlike the Norris LaGuardia Act,
Section 15 of the N.L.R.A.2 provides that in any case of conflict
between the N.L.R.A. and the Bankruptcy Act, the provisions of the
N.L.R.A. shall control except where they cannot be validly enforced.
Thus the "practical effect" of the National Labor Relations Act in
regards to a bankruptcy or reorganization proceeding is that the Board's
jurisdiction over elections and unfair labor practices cannot be pre-
empted by the courts having jurisdiction over bankrupts.12
Not only is the power of the N.L.R.B. over the employer in bank-
ruptcy made secure by §15 of the Actm but its extent is clearly de-
veloped in the case law on the point and is broad enough to include
not only a trustee per se, but anyone acting in the same capacity as
a trustee in bankruptcy.2 8 In the case of N.L.R.B. v. The Baldwin
121. 11 US.C.A. S 511.
122. 29 US.C.A. § 160 (a).
123. 29 US.C.A. 1 152 (1).
124. Ibid.
125. 29 U.S.C.A. S 165.
126. I CCH LABOR LAW REPoRTE_ par. 1700.
127. 29 U.S.C.A. 1 165.
128. Thus in American Buslines, Inc, 151 F. Supp. 877, 32 L.C. par. 70,772 (D.C.
Neb. 1957), it was held that
The legislative purpose to include within the employers affected judicially desig-
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Locomotive Works it was clearly pointed out that where the bank-
rupt itself was operating the business under the direction of the District
Court, he was in effect the same as the trustee in bankruptcy and was
therefore subject to the Board's jurisdiction in-so-far as unfair labor
practices were concerned. 30 Furthermore, the Board's power over
unfair labor practices is-as is otherwise generally true-not generally
limited by the fact that the employer may be going through bankruptcy
or reorganization proceedings.' 31
While the general statement that the assumption of jurisdiction over
an employer by a court of bankruptcy will not limit the power of the
N.L.R.B. over any labor disputes with which the employer may be
connected is true, there is one situation which, while at first glance
it may appear to be an unimportant detail, may very well serve to limit
the Board's power in a number of cases.
This specific situation arises in regards to the time of filing of the
complaint with the Board. Where the complaint is made with the
Board prior to the employer's filing for reorganization of bankruptcy,
the Board's proceedings are not, thereby, in any way affected. Doubt
about this question was finally resolved by the Supreme Court when
nated trustees or receivers, & even by express mention, trustees in bankruptcy,
is made unmistakably clear. The existence or intervention of bankruptcy or the
corporate reorganization of an employer is not allowed to deprive his or its
employees of the rights defined & assured to them by the act.
129. N.L.R.B. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F. 2d 39 (3rd. Cir. 1942).
130. See N.L.R.B. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, Ibid. in which the court held:
The jurisdiction of a United States District Court in Bankruptcy does not em-
brace the power to treat with a debtor's unfair labor practice which may inter-
fere with interstate commerce. Nor is such a court's leave to the Board to pro-
ceed in [the] appropriate manner required. By sec. 10 (a) Of the N.L.R.A. the
Board is expressly empowered to prevent any person from engaging in and unfair
labor practices affecting commerce and that power is exclusive in the Board and
[is] unaffected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been
or may be established... The act moreover explicitly removes the possibility of
any restraint upon the Board's power which might be thought to arise where
the employer's properties and business are operated under an order of a District
Court in a reorganization proceeding in bankuptcy.
131. Cf: Matter of American Buslines, (Note 128, supra) in which it was specifically
argued that the bankruptcy court ought to claim and exercise jurisdiction to intercept
the proceeding from the Board by virtue of the pendency of the main reorganization
action and as a means of protecting its jurisdiction & exclusive control over the debtor.
There it was held:
•..* bankruptcy & reorganization proceedings in federal courts have been held
inadequate to invest the courts in which they are pending with the authority




in the case of Nathanson v. the N.L.R.B.3 2 it was held that the bank-
ruptcy court shall "stay its hand" for a reasonable period of time
pending the determination by the N.L.R.B. of the amount of back
pay certain persons were entitled to receive from the corporation
which was found by the Board prior to adjudication in bankruptcy
to have engaged in unfair labor practices.as That this particular point
is so well established as to be taken for granted can be seen in such
cases as McKesson & Robbins, Inc. 4
It would thus appear that the only difference between a proceeding
before the Board where the employer subsequent to the complaint, but
prior to the decision becomes insolvent, and the usual case where the
employer remains solvent throughout would be the minor procedural
details of re-opening the record-if all evidence had earlier been taken-
so as to make the trustee in bankruptcy a party to the proceeding.a
Furthermore, it would appear that even this wouldn't be necessary in a
case where the employer-debtor was serving as a receiver under
Chapter X reorganization proceedings.",
On the other hand, where the complaint is filed with the Board
after the employer has filed bankruptcy or reorganization papers there
appears to be some authority to the effect that the bankruptcy court
has exclusive jurisdiction and that the Board cannot pre-empt the court
once the court has begun its proceedings. Thus in the Matter of Grower
Shipper Vegetable Association v. Fruit & Vegetable Worker's Union'8"
where several of the individual members of the Vegetable Grower-
shipper Association had filed petitions under the Bankruptcy Act prior
to the Union's charges of unfair labor practices, the Board dismissed
the charges against one of the employers even though it had found that
that employer was directly involved with the commission of the unfair
labor practices, with which it had been charged. 3 8  The sole basis
132. 344 U.S. 25, (1952).
133. The bankruptcy court normally supervises the liquidation of claims but the rule
is not inexorable. A sound discretion may indicate that a particular controversy should
be remitted to another tribunal for litigation. And where the matter in controversy has
been entrusted by Congress to an administrative agency the bankruptcy court normally
should stay its hand pending an administrative decision.-Smith v. Hoboken R. Co,
328 U.S. 123 (1945); Thomson v. Texas M.R. Co, 328 US. 134 (1945).
134. In Re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 19 NLRB 778 (1940).
135. See Ryan Car Co., 21 NLRB 139 (1940).
136. See Baldwin Locomotive Works, Note 129, supra.
137. 15 NLRB 322 (1939).
138. As to this matter the authors would take direct issue with the discussion of
the Vegetable Association case found at 1 CCH LABOR LAW REPORTER par. 1700.07. CCH
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for this dismissal was, apparently, the fact that the employer was
undergoing bankruptcy at the time the charges were filed.
This apparent limitation on the N.L.R.B.'s power is not, however,
so well established as to be free from all doubt. Two years prior to the
Vegetable Association case, the Board, in deciding basically the same
question in the Matter of Ralph A. Frundlich'3 9 held that it would not
stay its hearings in spite of the fact that proceedings for reorganization
had been initiated prior to the issuance of the Board's complaint. It
might be noted in this case, however, that the plan of reorganization
prepared by the debtor-employer itself did call for the Board's pro-
ceeding with its hearing.140  Thus two interpretations of the Board's
decision in the Frundlicb case can be made:
correctly states that the Board dismissed the case against one employer where reorganiza-
tion proceedings had begun prior to the filing of the charges, but it goes on to
throw doubt on the matter by saying, "It also appeared from the evidence that the
company had probably not violated the act." The inaccuracy of this statement can
clearly be seen at the top of p. 366 of the Board's decision. There, the Board says:
Of the firms named as respondents, however, only one was directly involved in
any of the individual cases discussed....
At that point the Board has a footnote 34 which says: "also H.P. Garin Co .... but
for reasons explained below, the case against the respondent will be dismissed . . " In
explaining why the charges "against the respondent will be dismissed," the Board near
the bottom of p. 366 states: 'We are also granting the motion of H.P. Garin, to
dismiss the complaint against [his company] of the estate of which he has been
appointed receiver." H.P. Garin had filed in bankruptcy prior to the issuance of the
Board's complaint.
The authors of this paper contend that the reading of these statements in their
proper context would require the conclusion that here the Board has said that it
will not entertain charges, even where there is evidence to support them, against an
employer who filed in Bankruptcy prior to the filing of charges with the Board.
The fact that the Board is limiting this exception to cases where the employer had
already filed prior to the charges being made against it appears in the Board's dicta on
p. 367 where it states:
Moreover, proof of [bankruptcy] of a corporation occurring after its commission
of unfair labor practices would not appear to require dismissal of a complaint
against it ....
139. 2 NLRB 802, (1937).
140. 1 CCH LABOR LAw REPoa ra par. 1700.09 states in regards to this case: ".
hearings were held by the Board prior to the approval of the plan of reorganiza-
ion... :' If this statement be correct, the argument that in the Fruendlich case the
Board refused to recognize any limitation on its jurisdiction in spite of prior jurisdiction
by the Bankruptcy Court, would be given strong support. However, according to the
report of the case the hearing apparently was not held until after the reorganization
plan had been approved. The petition for reorganization was filed on March 8, 1935.
The complaint was filed with the Board in November of 1935, however, the hearings
apparently did not start until Feb. 1936; one month after the plan for reorganization




1) that the Board in this case refused to recognize the theory that
where the reorganization begins prior to the filing of the unfair. labor
practice complaint the Board should not interfere with the bankruptcy
proceedings; or
2) that the Board, while recognizing the above theory, felt that the
continuation of its hearings in this case would not conflict with the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court (since the reorganization plan
itself specifically called for the continuation of the Board's hearings,
and further provided that the Board's decision should bind the suc-
cessor.)
In a similar situation decided by the U.S. District Court for Eastern
Pa.' 4' it was held that the Board could not succeed in vacating the
restraining order in a case where the labor complaint was filed after
the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings.14 However, the effect of the
ruling was somewhat clouded by the reasoning of the court that:
There is no practical need to vacate the restraining order because
the 77-B proceedings have been concluded and only await the final
order of the court. As we view it, when the final order is made, all
persons are then as free to pursue the debtor as if the petition under
77-B had not been filed.143
In spite of the lack of any clear cut decision ennunciating a rule
stating this time limitation on the Board's jurisdiction it would appear
from what precedent there is that such is indeed the rule. The underly-
ing basis for such a conclusion is that such a rule would best effectuate
the Congressional intent in regard to both the N.L.R.A. and the
Chandler Act, i.e. the fact that such a rule would best effectuate the
purpose of both acts without thereby defeating the intent of either.
This would.be so in that, by allowing the Board to continue proceedings
begun prior to filing under the Chandler Act there would be no de-
leterious effect on the successful completion of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings since the proceedings before the Board would be taken into
consideration in any order of the bankruptcy or reorganization court.
Furthermore, not to do so would be to defeat the intent of the N.L.R.A.,
since any award that might be given by the Board based on proceedings
141. In the Matter of Baldwin Locomotive Works, 21 F. Supp. 91 (1938).
142. The court will not disturb a plan of reorganization with all the required ap-
provals to include obligations which the N.L.R.B. may impose. Id. at page 422.
143. Id. at 423.
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begun prior to filing would be a provable claim in bankruptcy, 44 and
thus would be discharged by the final order in the bankruptcy court.
This, of course, would then mean that any claims would be lost to the
union if the Board could not proceed.
On the other hand, to allow the Board to come in on a case after
the bankruptcy or reorganization proceeding had begun would have the
exact opposite effect. It would defeat the intent of the Bankruptcy
Act to provide for the orderly and equitable discharge or reorganization
of debtor-employers unable to meet maturing obligations by providing
a method of expeditious reorganization on terms insuring fair treat-
ment to all parties. 145 If the Board, or any worker could come in at any
time after the dissolution or reorganization proceedings had begun and
assert new claims against the debtor, it would destroy the stability of
the debtor's position and thereby considerably weaken or even destroy
the satisfactory conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings. In addition,
to allow such intervention would be to allow new claims to be brought
after all rights had supposedly been frozen-i.e. those which are es-
tablished as of the date of filing in bankruptcy or reorganization pro-
ceedings. This would produce a result which would make the job of the
court overseeing the bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings almost
impossible. At the same time, however, such a rule would not harm
the workers or the Union since the Board's proceedings would simply
be postponed until after the reorganization proceedings were concluded,
and thus any award would not thereby be discharged.'4
THE EFFECT OF N.L.R.B. PROCEEDINGS ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE DEBTOR'S ESTATE
Once the question of the power of the N.L.R.B. over the trustee
or debtor is established, it becomes important to know the effect that
such proceedings will have on the administration of the debtor's estate.
One of the most common problems that any party to simulations bank-
144. See Nathanson v. N.L.R.B., 344 U.S. 25, 32 (1952).
145. See 8 (b) CJS. Bankruptcy § 873.
146. See In the Matter of Baldwin Locomotive Works, note 141, supra:
... When a plan, as it is called, is finally approved, the debtor, as we have often
said, resumes control of its affairs as if no 77-B petition had been filed. When
done, we are done with this debtor & will be quite willing to turn it over to the
tender mercies of the Labor Board, or of any Court or tribunal. We naturally,
and we think quite properly, prefer to keep our proceedings undisturbed by those
of any other court.
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ruptcy and N.L.R.B. proceedings will have to face is determining the
effect the finding of unfair labor practices will have on the bankruptcy
proceedings. Basically, in this regards, the rule is that the Board's
power, where it assumes jurisdiction, is wholly unaffected by the re-
organization proceedings. 47
The best example of the operation of this general principal can be
seen in those cases where the Board, having taken jurisdiction finds
against the employers and makes a back pay award. In such a case the
award becomes a valid claim on the estate, provable on bankruptcy
just as any other claim. 48 On the other hand, the award will not be
given any special priority because it is awarded by a government
agency,140 and thus it will be treated as any other claim for wages under
normal bankruptcy proceedings.8 0 Likewise, the bankruptcy court need.
not recognize any backpay award where it is unliquidated; and though
the establishment of the exact amount owed under such an order is the
responsibility of the Board, if the Board does not act within a reasonable
time to liquidate the claim, the law does not requirethe court to hold up
the bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings.' 5 '
A second rather common problem facing both the trustee in bank-
ruptcy and his employees is the effect that a petition for representation
will have on the bankruptcy proceedings, and visa versa. Here again,
the result will usually be the same as if there were no bankruptcy
proceeding involved.
It has been held that since the holding of a representation election does
not significantly disrupt bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings,52
147. Even though some of the unfair labor practices with which the respondant
is charged were commit.ted while it was managing and operating its business and
properties as the debtor in possession under court order, it will hardly be denied
that a debtor in passession is responsible for unfair labor practices which occur
during a reorganization. Its status as an employer is no different, in so far as the
NJ,.R.A.... is concerned than that of any other employer.
... Court supervision of corporate reorganization affords the operating posses-
sor no freedom from its statutory duty to its employees. And where managerial
control and economic interest of the debtor in possession and the reorganization
are the same it could be only the blindness of formalism that would suggest
separately instituted proceedings against the predecessor and the successor for
the redress of their respective grievances....




152. . . .The language of the order [i.e., the usual restraining order in bankruptcy
proceedings] . . . .has reference to several specific activities, none of which,
as the court believes ...will, either interfere with possession or management
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the federal courts are without power to enjoin the N.L.R.B. from hold-
ing a representation election among the debtor's employees.'5 3 In such
a situation the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to hold the election just
as if there were no bankruptcy proceedings involved, and once the
election is held the trustee has just as much duty to bargain collectively
with the representative'5 as it would under normal circumstances.lm6
CONCLUSION
Every year in the United States there are many thousands of bank-
ruptcies and reorganization proceedings before the various federal dis-
trict courts.-- It is reasonable to assume since so much of our industry
today is unionized that a large portion of these proceedings may involve
some conflict with the national labor policy as expressed in the Wagner
Act and the National Labor Relations Act.
It is with this in mind that we have attempted here to formulate
a few general rules which may serve as guidejines to those parties who
may find themselves involved in such a situation either as an employer,
or as the representative of the employees of a firm going through such
proceedings.
In brief, there are three points that should be remembered by the
parties in any such a position:
First, it should be noted that in spite of the language used by the
courts in many cases, and in spite of the explicit language used in
section 14 of the N.L.R.A., it appears to be clear that the labor law
by the debtor ... in the discharge of his duties or interfere with the exclusive
jurisdiction of this court over said debtor . . . and [his] . . . properties.-In Re
American Buslines, 157 F. Supp. 877 at 881 (D.C. Neb, 1957).
153. Id. at 885.
154. Third Ave. Transit v. Quill, 192 F. 2d 971 (2nd Cir. 1951).
155. But See; In all cases in which a representative election has been envolved, the
question of employee representation arose prior to the filing of the employer in bank-
ruptcy. What effect such an order would have if filed after the bankruptcy proceedings
had begun has not been determined. See the discussion of time element in such cases
at pages 37-44, supra.
Furthermore, what effect the complete dissolution of the debtor will have on the
representation petition is not fully clear. From the language of the various cases
which have discussed the point it is probable that the Board would not decree such
an election where it is certain that the debtor will shortly thereafter be dissolved,
however, if there be the slightest possibility that the debtor will survive the bankruptcy
or reorganization, the election will be held. See In Re Costal Plywood & Timber Co,
102 NLRB 300 (1952).
156. CCH BAmx. L. REP. 10-27-65 No. 42 states that in 1965 there were 88 Chapter X
reorganization proceedings and 149,820 voluntary straight bankruptcies filed; of these
almost 17,000 were business filings.
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will not always take precedence over that of the Bankruptcy Act,
but rather that the courts will try to balance the equities between the
parties so as to give maximum justice to both.
Thus, while under no circumstances may an employer seek to avoid
the effects of the national labor legislation by filing for reorganization
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,157 it is equally settled that a
labor union may not run roughshod over an employer in bankruptcy
or reorganization who has at all times tried to keep good faith with his
employees. 50 And while the cases say that the labor law will take
precedence in any bankruptcy case in which there is a labor dispute0 9
it is also apparent that where the court feels that the equities lie with
the employer, it will attempt to treat the matter as something other than
a "labor dispute" as defined by section 104 of the Norris LaGaurdia
Act.160
Secondly, and again in line with the theory of balancing the equities,
it seems highly unlikely that the Bankruptcy Court would still view the
labor contract as it is discussed in Wiley, i.e., that the court will still view
an employees' union as not being an "affected" patty in a reorganization.
While it may be true, that the best solution in this area would be specific
legislation allowing for a special labor arbitrator in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, in any case where there is a labor contract and a substantial
continuity of the debtor enterprise is contemplated, it appears that the
courts will recognize the union's claims where there is a labor contract
in existence which includes an arbitration clause, and it furthermore
appears that the union's status as an affected party can no longer be
ignored.
Finally, it similarly appears that while the general rule is that the
N.L.R.B. will not be limited in any way in its handling of labor
disputes by bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings, there is at least a
strong indication ihat the Board itself as well as some courts will rec-
ognize such a limitation in any case where the continuation or com-
mencement of Board proceedings will seriously disrupt the administration
of the bankrupt's estate.""
On the other hand, it also appears that both the courts and the
Board (and arbitrators where they may be involved) are striving to so
construe matters which normally are within the exclusive jurisdiction
157. Teamsters v. Quick Charge, 14 L.C. par. 64,496 (10th Cir. 1948).
158. In Re Cleveland & S. Brewing Co, 11 F. Supp. 198 (1936).
159. Supra note 157.
160. Supra see note 16.
161. Supra see pages 37 & 38.
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of the Bankruptcy Court, as to provide the greatest possible protection
of the rights of the employees.
In brief, the rule governing any conflict between the policies ex-
pressed in the various national labor acts, and that of the national Bank-
ruptcy Act should be restated to recognize that where there is such
conflict there will be a weighing of the equities involved, and that the
law will prevail which will best effectuate the justifiable expectations of
all the parties with the least interference with the policy of the con-
flicting legislation, provided:
1: that all things being equal there is a legislative presumption in
favor of the labor law controlling; and
2: that whichever tribunal ultimately does take jurisdiction over
the particular problem, its power over the matter will be exclusive and
complete.1 2
S. Strother Smith, III
Allan Zaleski
162. cf; N.L.R.B. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F. 2d 39,44 (1942) with the
language of the court in the case of In Re Cleveland & S. Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp.
198, 201:
... After the bankruptcy court has assumed jurisdiction over the property it
has jurisdiction to determine all rights there-in.
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